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Nation Building: Installing Democracy in Iraq After Saddam

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of National Security Decision Making curriculum.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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3 February 2003

Abstract of

NATION BUILDING: INSTALLING DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ AFTER SADDAM

Nation building is the child of regime change. With the specter of another Iraqi war looming less than a dozen years after Gulf War I, a key war termination question arises: How to fix and stabilize Iraq after the military campaign to oust Saddam Hussein?

America's long term Desired End State (DES) of peace and stability in Southwest Asia will depend on successful nation building in Iraq. Doing it right will be safer and cheaper than doing it again. This paper examines the concept of nation building and offers a comprehensive plan for nation building and democracy that will achieve the long-term American goal of stability in Iraq and the Persian Gulf region.

Nation building in Arab states is unprecedented. Iraq is an especially complicated case due to ethnic and religious animosity among the Kurds, Shi'as and Sunni Muslims. The solution is a democracy modeled after the Swiss Cantonal System with Arab peacekeepers in the cities and America controlling the oil and hence influencing the new government.

Introduction: “Nation building is the child of regime change.¹” With the specter of another Iraqi war looming less than a dozen years after Gulf War I, a key war termination question arises: How to fix and stabilize Iraq after the military campaign to oust Saddam Hussein?

Thesis: America’s long term Desired End State (DES) of peace and stability in Southwest Asia will depend on successful nation building in Iraq. Doing it right will be safer and cheaper than doing it again. This paper examines the concept of nation building and offers a comprehensive plan for nation building and democracy that will achieve the long-term American goal of stability in Iraq and the Persian Gulf region.

Impact – Why this matters? In Iraq American power and technology will be decisive in battle. But that victory will be short lived and mean little in the long run if we don’t follow up with a well thought out and viable plan for successful nation building. Failure to implement such a plan will certainly lead to a future crisis such as an ethnic separatist movement, civil war or guerrilla campaign carried on by the remnants of the Republican Guard, or the rise of a fundamentalist regime. If our goal is stability, what is the point of invading if instability quickly follows? What is the point of winning the war and losing the peace? Most importantly, if Iraq slips into chaos, what kind of precedent will be set should America need U.N. or Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) approval for regime change in another Muslim state? On the other hand, a successful intervention leading to a democratic Iraq may deter other authoritarian regimes from pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or attempting to foster or export Islamic fundamentalism.

Nation-[building] is a methodical, coordinated interagency approach to enhancing security through mutually agreed upon requirements for infrastructure and institutional

*development. It addresses the root causes of instability by focusing collective energies and capabilities toward the development of key host nation institutions, both public and private.*²

Analysis. Nation building in Iraq, or any Arab country for that matter, is unprecedented.³ Iraq is fundamentally different from El Salvador in 1980, Haiti in 1915 or the Philippines in 1902 and any of the European countries brought back to economic vitality under the Marshall Plan beginning in 1947.

*A nation is a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound together by ties of history, culture, and common ancestry.*⁴

Contrary to previous nation-building efforts, Iraq lacks what political scientists call the cornerstones in the formation of stable states, specifically common territory, language, religion and race.⁵

Democracy will also be unprecedented in Iraq. Since 1958, Iraq has witnessed a succession of dictators, bloody coups and assassination attempts.⁶ Though harder to install than an authoritarian regime, a successful tradition of democratic self government offers the prospect of enduring stability. A free and friendly Iraq will also provide another break in the arc of instability between North Africa and Central Asia.

In designing a post-Saddam democratic Iraq, the National Security Council (NSC) will face nation-building choices. Will they try for a shining liberal democracy with a vibrant economy, or simply a functioning representative government and economy? In this case good trumps perfect because it allows for a smaller footprint and a timely exit. A lesser plan can still achieve success; call it nation-building light. Long range projects such as new schools and dams are best handled by the U.N. or by a new Democratic Republic of Iraq (DRI). Building a government is one thing, building a nation is another. In his article, "Liberal Imperialism," Max Boot states that,

*If the American goal is to recreate Ohio in [Iraq], then the occupiers are doomed to disappointment. But if the goals are more modest, American rule can serve the interests of occupiers and occupied alike. Put another way, nation building is generally too ambitious a task, but state building is not; the apparatus of a functioning state can be developed much more quickly than a national consciousness.*⁷

To achieve success in Iraq we must clearly define our DES. Perhaps America's immediate DES is the absence of a tyrant pursuing nuclear weapons with the potential to again wreak havoc on the Persian Gulf region and the world economy.⁸ As a candidate, President Bush vowed to pull U.S. troops out of nation building in Bosnia and Kosovo, and criticized efforts in Haiti. The difference lies in the fact that those nations are in a strategic sense much less relevant than Iraq.⁹ To avoid a potential *third* war with Iraq in a single generation we must see that a stable, democratic government blossoms. The specific components of our DES that will best stabilize the region and decrease the possibility of Iraqi War III are as follows:¹⁰

- A Territorially intact, federalized Iraq
- A Functioning, representative, pro-Western, secular government
- A Functioning, representative military and police
- A Working economy
- A WMD free Iraq

Turkey is illustrative of a Muslim country with those qualities. Working backwards from this DES in Iraq will eventually lead to a lasting "Peace and stability in the region," the elusive and so far only unrealized objective of Desert Storm.

At the present time, Iraq's strategic Center of Gravity (COG) is the regime. Iraq's operational COG is the Republican Guard. They allow Saddam to remain in power. Once the regime is toppled, the operational and strategic COG both shift to the will of the people. Should a civil or counterinsurgency war break out, the COG will remain the will of the Iraqi people. Nation building is essentially a military operation other than war (MOOTW), and in

any MOOTW the COG is most likely the will of the people.¹¹ The will of the people can be won. We did it in the Philippines in 1902, Haiti in 1915 and El Salvador in the 1980s. Rural goat herders only want a better life for their children.¹²

The American operational COG prior to and during a regime change in Iraq is access and lines of communication, neither of which are seriously threatened by Iraq. That COG will not shift when Saddam is toppled and nation building starts. America's critical weakness will be casualties, specifically their influence on our strategic COG—the will of the American people. The public will not allow our troops to stay in a protracted conflict once Saddam is gone.¹³ This fact is not lost on our opponents who have learned from our Vietnam experience. Beirut in 1983 and Mogadishu in 1993 are more recent examples.

Intact Iraq. Keeping Iraq intact is one of America's publicly stated objectives.¹⁴ Accomplishing this objective will be challenging for two reasons. First, Iraq is built upon a flawed foundation, a region carved out of the former Ottoman Empire along colonial lines and ruled by a League of Nations mandate given to the British after WWI. Iraq has never possessed what Clausewitz refers to as *trinity*: the essential pillars of a nation; a united government, people and army. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) may soon be given the complicated task of federalizing what Thomas Friedman terms an “Arab Yugoslavia.” Some would say America is paying the price for 400 hundred years of European colonialism.¹⁵

Second, in Iraq, historic animosities from ethnic and religious violence and political and economic marginalization run rampant. The most egregious act of ethnic hatred was Saddam's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds during the infamous *anfal* campaign in 1988.¹⁶ Fifty thousand Kurds were annihilated.¹⁷ Following Gulf War I, simultaneous Kurdish and Sunni rebellions against Saddam were brutally crushed. Balkanizing Iraq would

lead to the establishment of three nations with the Kurds in the north, Sunni's in the center, and Shi'as in the south. The international community and especially our regional allies are adamantly opposed to a division of the country into separate entities.¹⁸ The ethnic and religious divisions are illustrated clearly on the demographic maps of Iraq in the appendix.¹⁹

Turkish concern over ethnic Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq is a prime example of allied contention. Should Kurdish nationalism gain a foothold in Iraq, they understandably fear that nationalistic passion will spread to ethnic Kurds in Turkey. The religious angle concerns the Shi'a Muslims majorities in Iraq and Iran. They comprise 63 percent of Iraq's population and 89 percent of Iran's.²⁰ Iraqi Shi'as share a common religion with Iran but are ethnically Arab, not Persian. So far, the majority Shi'as in Iraq have been unable to convert their numerical superiority into political control.²¹ Saudi Arabia naturally fears the Iraqi Shi'a majority and the accompanying fundamentalists allying themselves with Iran and filling any power vacuum in Iraq. The political marginalization concerns Saddam as a Sunni Tikriti, dictating from an ethnic population base of just 22 percent.²²

Functioning Democracy. A clear definition of the term *functioning* as it pertains to the representative government and military is necessary for any exit strategy. New governments, like babies, first learn to crawl, then walk and then run. Once the DRI can walk, CENTCOM can begin a phased withdrawal, provided the Kurds, Shi'as and regional foes are under no illusions concerning our commitment to a stable Iraq.

Leaving a dysfunctional government would be a disaster that would damage American prestige and possibly lead to another indefinite troop commitment or the rise of a despot of unknown ilk. If a dictator returns, Iraq will again be able to start wars with no checks and balances, just as it did when they invaded Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990.

History illustrates that democracies start wars less frequently than dictators, possibly because democratic politicians are used to compromise.

Police. It will be necessary to install a representative federal police force in order to prevent the force from being used by one ethnic group to exploit another. Inclusion and cooperation between ethnic Arabs and Kurds during the occupation will greatly improve the chances of democracy succeeding.²³ The police forces in individual state governments will be representative of those states only.

Pro-Western. The term pro-western speaks for itself. Why trade one hostile regime for another in a country with the world's second largest proven oil reserves?

Secular. The formation of a secular government will be crucial in order to contain Islamic fundamentalism. Afghanistan's Taliban and the Iranian revolution of 1979 are cases in point. Islamic clerics have the organization, money and charisma to win democratic elections as we have seen in Algeria in 1991.²⁴ That is particularly true in countries lacking democratic traditions, of which Iraq has none.²⁵

Economy. Jump-starting Iraq's stagnant economy will be a function of how quickly oil exports can be increased and peace can be established. Iraq exports currently average 2.45 million barrels per day (bbl/d), although with large fluctuations.²⁶ Industry experts estimate that Iraq currently has a sustainable oil production capacity of 3.0 million bbl/d.²⁷ At current market prices that amounts to \$4.6 billion per year in additional revenues, largely because Iraq has the lowest crude oil production costs in the world.²⁸ Add in the 28 percent tapped off to fund U.N. oversight²⁹ and the billions spent on weapons and it is clear that Iraq has the resources with which to finance reconstruction.

But fixing Iraq's oil production infrastructure will take precious time, especially if Saddam torches the oil wells on his way out. When the retreating Iraqi army set over 700 oil wells ablaze in Kuwait in 1991, it took 258 days to extinguish all the fires.³⁰ As of early 2002, only 24 of 73 Iraqi oil fields were producing because of antiquated or damaged equipment.³¹ Additionally, continued neglect and desperation could easily lead to a 5-15 percent annual decline in production due to questionable extraction methods such as water injection.³² Fixing Iraq's oil industry will allow the Iraqi economy to flourish again. Increasing Iraq's oil production to full potential (an estimated 6.0 million bbls/day)³³ will further advance the economy. Iraq's petroleum reserves eliminate the scarcity problem regarding the ends and means of reconstruction.

The task of fixing Iraq's economy greatly depends on the state of the nation following Saddam's departure. For we not only have to fix what was broken during the invasion, but also the damage from two nation state wars, a civil war and a dozen years of sanctions. In Afghanistan, this concern heavily influenced ROE to the point that roads and bridges were not allowed to be targeted.³⁴ Gen. Franks feared further damage to the already dilapidated infrastructure.³⁵ Indeed, the cost of rebuilding after war can be "as staggering as the conduct of war itself."³⁶

*If cities are flattened instead of liberated, American legitimacy in the eyes of the world and of the Iraqi people will be shot.*³⁷

Inflation in Iraq currently runs 60 percent annually.³⁸ New currency, minted by the Europeans and pegged to the euro would erase that instantly. American mints may be perceived as imperialistic. Using European banks will prevent that and will make the Europeans stakeholders in the Iraqi economy.

WMD. U.S. threats of regime change or nuclear retaliation effectively deterred Saddam from using WMD in Iraq I. Since a regime change is the strategic objective of Iraq II, Saddam may feel he has nothing to lose regarding the use of WMD.

Prohibitions on WMD must be written into the new DRI constitution.³⁹ Just as critical, evidence of WMD must be found (not destroyed in the invasion). The absence of proof will be interpreted as an unjustified invasion, which will not improve stability in the region. Unfettered access to Iraqi WMD labs and scientists will provide allied intelligence a rare glimpse into any assistance that may have been provided by foreign sources. Additionally, Iraqi scientists will require some sort of gainful employment.

Counter Argument. It will be far cheaper, faster and safer to install an authoritarian regime. America has a dismal record in nation building. Trying to install democracy in Iraq will be even more futile given the lack of cohesiveness among ethnic and religious factions, as illustrated in Bosnia. Not only does Iraq face the same ethnic and religious complications as Bosnia, but also Arab skepticism about western institutions as well as an Iraqi demographic time bomb.

The skepticism arises from Arab views of western educations and ideals as “hostile,” “anti-Islam[ic]” and secular in nature.⁴⁰

The demographics problem is documented in a CIA Conference Report about sedition, civil strife and rioting in Sri Lanka.⁴¹ Similar trends were noted in South Korea and India.⁴² The study noted that major conflicts occurred in all three countries precisely during times when the population of youths ages 15-24 exceeded 20 percent of the population. As the “youth bulge” aged, things quieted down. Currently, 41 percent of Iraqis are under age 15.⁴³ Clearly, Iraq faces tumultuous times in the near future.

In terms of cost, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that occupying Iraq will cost \$228 billion for a 5 year occupation.⁴⁴ (The human toll in terms of casualties, of course, can't be measured in dollars.) Indeed, projecting only a 5-year occupation may be shortsighted as U.S. troops are still in Bosnia after 7 years. Expecting Iraq to cover the costs of some or all of that lends weight to charges of imperialism. How can the richest nation on earth expect a conquered nation to pay for the invasion and occupation?

Regardless of who covers the cost, nation building often ends in limited success at best. Supporters of nation building point to Allied success in post WWII Germany, Italy and Japan as precedents for full scale nation building in Iraq. All three were transformed from war-ravaged military dictatorships into liberal democracies. But if nation building is a panacea for instability, why do we have to go back to 1948 to find success? And upon analysis, the success in Europe and Japan is possibly overblown, especially when compared to the current situation in Iraq.

Germany, Italy and Japan in 1948 were homogeneous and industrialized countries with vast pools of skilled labor.⁴⁵ There were precedents with respect for property rights, the rule of law and a market economy.⁴⁶ Germany and Italy had parliamentary traditions. They only lacked capital and political stability. England, another Marshall Plan recipient, relatively intact compared to Germany and Italy, received the most aid and achieved the slowest economic growth.⁴⁷ In Europe, aid never exceeded 5 percent of any recipient's GDP, and many had growing economies when the aid started.⁴⁸

Japan is an especially flawed comparison with Iraq as the Japanese were deeply respectful of authority. For example, without a car in sight, Japanese pedestrians wait

patiently in the rain at a crosswalk with a red light.⁴⁹ Most importantly, Japan possessed an obedience mechanism embodied in the Emperor.

Despite the failure of nation building in the Balkans, that case is often cited as a shining success and brilliant model for democracy in Iraq. The distinguished individuals who subscribe to this view include Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard Holbrooke,⁵⁰ who served in the Clinton Administration and author Stephen Ambrose, quoted below.

The nation building in Germany, Japan and South Korea – made possible by foreign aid and its companion, the American Armed Forces stationed abroad – was one of the great developments of the 20th century. It can be done again in the Muslim world.

I saw it happening in Bosnia...a country that is about one-third Muslim, one-third Croat, and one-third Serb, a country in which people have been killing each other for centuries. But when the American Stabilization Force came to head up a 33-nation peacekeeping force, the Bosnian people saw Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, black Americans, and white Americans, men and women, plus Greeks and Turks, Germans and French, all working together. Now the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats are following their example, rebuilding, cooperating, creating a new nation.⁵¹

In truth, Bosnia is a failure waiting to happen. “If it were a success, we wouldn’t still be there.⁵²” Holbrooke has a conflict of interest in describing Bosnia as a success because he chaired the Dayton Peace Accords.⁵³ And Ambrose neglected to mention key facts. The government is dysfunctional and the Dayton Peace Accords are tenuous.

...two of the three ethnic groups actively oppose [the] Dayton [Peace Accords], and are prepared to wait until such a time as the international community withdraws and the agreement can be laid to rest.⁵⁴

Indeed, our most recent nation building attempts in Bosnia in 1995, Somalia in 1993 and Haiti in 1992 all ended in disaster.

Despite years of work and billions of dollars, the efforts failed big-time in all three cases. Somalia is as politically fractured and chaotic today as when the first U.S. troops went ashore in December 1992. The U.S. intervention in Haiti ousted a corrupt, violent military dictatorship. But today Haiti is ruled by an equally corrupt, violent dictatorship run by the dominant Lavalas Party. Despite an ongoing occupation by thousands of NATO troops to implement the Dayton peace agreement, Bosnia is still divided among three ethnic factions.

*It is no closer to being a viable country today than it was when Dayton was signed in November 1995. Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia all have woeful economies that barely function.*⁵⁵

Bosnia illustrates the difference between nation building aspirations and what actually happens in the real world. In his book, *Politics Among Nations*, Hans Morgenthau warned that politics must take into account reality and not focus on what we aspire that reality to be. The best lesson concerning the former Yugoslavia is the failure in treating just the symptoms.⁵⁶ Yes, the fighting and ethnic cleansing have stopped, for now. NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) merely separated the combatants. But does anyone doubt that the fighting will commence again a day or a week after SFOR departs?

Would you give your life for Iraqi democracy? Democratizing Iraq lengthens any nation building effort and drains precious resources from a limited defense budget. We didn't democratize Kuwait in 1991. Russia found democracy after years of authoritarian regimes without American help. Why can't Iraq?

Counter Counter Argument. The aforementioned arguments against installing a democracy in Iraq are flawed. In summary, critics cite Arab resentment, demographics, cost, dismal precedents, and they present a case for an authoritarian regime or monarchy. This paper addresses these arguments in order.

First, Arab resentment toward western ideals is segmented and changing. Currently, 25,000 Arab students are studying in the U.S.⁵⁷ Many embrace the west and choose to stay, causing a brain-drain in their native countries.⁵⁸

Second, the demographic "youth bulge" may not pose such a problem in Iraq because of oil. The youths were rioting or rebelling in Sri Lanka, South Korea and India because of a lack of housing, jobs and educational opportunities. Iraq's oil wealth can pay for those

necessities. And even if it couldn't, democracy is best suited to handle discontent, as witnessed during the turbulent 1960s as baby boomers reached the 15-24 age group.⁵⁹ Democracies are designed to drift with changing attitudes.

Third, the amounts cited in CBO estimates on the cost of a war and occupation ignores the costs of a future war, the subsequent occupation or decades of containment if a hostile dictator rises. Had we installed a democracy in Iraq in 1991, Iraq II and the \$228 billion might not be necessary today.⁶⁰ Additionally, the DRI can help offset some of the costs.

Fourth, our recent history of installing dictators in the Arab world has often met failure. In 1948 the U.S. overthrew the Syrian regime, only to have the new regime turn anti-American.⁶¹ In 1955, America backed a coup attempt against Nasser; it failed and he turned to the Soviets.⁶² The U.S. engineered the overthrow of Iranian nationalist President Mossadegh in 1954 and replaced him with the Shah.⁶³ That "success" was temporary and led to the rise of Khomeini and the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Bosnia stagnated because we tried to fix an unsolvable political situation with democracy modeled after France and the United States. That form of democracy ignores the ethnic, religious and political reality in Bosnia. If the proposed model of democracy (see solution) fails in Iraq, we can always revert to an authoritarian regime.

Previous monarchs and authoritarian regimes in Iraq all ended in bloody coups. Often, the entire bloodlines of the monarch or dictator were destroyed as well.

Lastly, re-installing the Emir of Kuwait was in the best interests of the U.S. He headed a secular government, was a key ally during the Iran-Iraq war and was not pursuing

WMD. Also, the U.N. Security Council resolution 678 authorizing Desert Storm called for the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government.⁶⁴

Solution. So, if we can't Balkanize Iraq by dividing it into three states, if we can't stay indefinitely to build a robust nation, and if the nation is built on a flawed foundation, what is the solution?

The answer is a government similar to the Swiss Cantonal system. In such a democratic system, Iraq's ethnic groups would all gain limited self-determination. The system minimizes "the direct relationship between ethnic conflict and non-democratic development."⁶⁵ That is critical because it takes all sides to make peace and only one to make war.

The Swiss Cantonal system would serve Iraq's diverse population well. Swiss citizens are all European, predominantly Christian, and ethnically diverse. That diversity includes ethnic German, French, Italian and Rhaeto-Romanic. They are overwhelmingly Christian, but divided into Catholic and Protestant faiths. That corresponds to Iraqi citizens, ethnically comprised of Kurds and Arabs, and divided religiously into Shi'a and Sunni faiths.

Under the Swiss cantonal model, the federal Iraqi government links the three Kurdish, Shi'a and Sunni cantons into one unified nation. But the federal government would only legislate and control affairs which are of interest to all the cantons, such as National Defense, Foreign Policy, OPEC representation and the Central Bank. The DRI army would be comprised of all three groups. The cantons determine all other issues via their own Parliaments and Constitutions, and are further divided into communes.⁶⁶ Cantonal legislative areas include education, labor, economic and social concerns. If a person is unhappy with

the social policies in a commune, they are free move to a different commune within the canton or to a different canton entirely.

The whole system is designed to prevent one group from unjustly benefiting at the expense of another, which has been the norm in recent Iraqi history. The cantonal system has served Switzerland well for over 700 years, providing one of the highest per capita incomes in the world in a country bereft of natural resources.⁶⁷

Though they won't be dependent on long-term foreign financial assistance, the complications facing any interim government in Iraq are considerable. The potential losers in an Iraqi cantonal system are the Kurds, who may see Saddam's ouster as their best chance for a nation state. But with Turkey's army to the north and America's to the south, what can they do? A cantonal system is certainly better than any deal they had since before the Ottoman Empire. Autonomy has long been their goal. They currently enjoy a de facto but temporary version of it (since 1991) under the protection of Allied aircraft in the northern no fly zone. With a cantonal system Kurdish semi-autonomy becomes permanent under the auspices of the U.N.

A representative Iraqi government will also face the daunting challenge of preventing reprisal attacks against the Sunnis. The minority Sunnis have been at the helm of power since well before Saddam came to power in 1979. They have controlled the military, police and judiciary with brutal repression.

Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). The ultimate measure of success will take years to realize. While military governor of West Germany, Eisenhower stated to his staff that success or failure "can only be judged 50 years from now. If by then Germany has a stable

and flourishing democracy, we will have succeeded.”⁶⁸ In Iraq, the hardest part will be in establishing a democratic tradition.

Converting our DES to numbers and then achieving those goals does not automatically spell success. Only the Ambassador and CENTCOM can make that determination based on the political realities in Iraq. Measuring the will of the Iraqi people is crucial yet hard to quantify in a land where honesty or dissent often meant execution in the past.

Our exit strategy must be performance based not timeline based. Recommended specific MOEs to meet to facilitate redeployment include:

- Free elections within 18 months and the absence of a fundamentalist win.
- The absence of a civil war or major guerrilla insurgency.
- A functioning and representative army capable of defensive maneuver.
- A functioning and representative air force, capable of day/VFR⁶⁹ defense, via ground controlled intercept.
- Inflation below 10 percent and GDP growth of 5 percent within one year.

Recommendations. Specific recommendations to assist in achieving this DES include:

- Diplomatic.

In war, politics influence strategy and war termination. In MOOTW, politics influences ends, ways and means. Therefore it will be necessary to select an Ambassador with a wealth of Arab and military experience. Retired Marine General Zinni would be ideal.

GCC states, notably Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, should be lobbied to forgive Iraq’s foreign debt, currently \$62.2 billion.⁷⁰ Savings for these nations will come in the form of decreased defense outlays vis-à-vis their new democratic neighbor to the north.

We should consider shutting off the oil pipeline flowing from Iraq into Syria if President Assad proves uncooperative. That pipeline currently provides an estimated \$100 million or so per month in illegal Iraqi oil exports to Syria at discount prices.⁷¹

The sooner peacekeeping can be transferred to U.N. or international auspices, the better. That will lessen the appearance of colonialism in the region, which will increase the sustainability of the mission.

If there is discontent in the population, then the individual and particular issues causing the discontent need to be addressed.⁷²

➤ Informational.

Communication is critical to achieving our DES. Though hard for America to fathom, the Iraqi's probably don't know where we stand on Saddam's future. They have little interaction with the world beyond the state controlled media. Instead, America is judged by its actions, which Iraqis view as helping Saddam rise to power, siding with Saddam by providing intelligence in the Iran-Iraq war and allowing Saddam to stay in power after Desert Storm.

America must communicate: to the Iraqis that we intend to guide Iraq to stability; to the Arab states that we will not be staying permanently; and to the American public that casualties are inevitable but the strategic security of America depends on our staying the course.⁷³ As evidence, cite that America fought to liberate Kuwait without infringing on sovereignty or keeping a drop of oil. Most recently that we liberated and continue to protect Muslim Kosovo.

Clearly, Al Jazeera will be the messenger of choice in the Arab world and therefore critical to our information operations. The Arab media have a vested interest in democracy

and the accompanying free flow of ideas. To assist in minimizing Arab media hostility, this author recommends the following:

- Providing Al Jazeera access to CENTCOM and the Ambassador, similar to FDR's fire side chats.
- Allied purchase (with Iraqi money) of advertising contracts on Al Jazeera for advertising Iraqi civil and commercial construction contracts in Pan-Arabia as well as Iraqi political campaign advertisements within Iraq.
- Radio Free Iraq.

➤ Military.

U.S. forces simply cannot occupy Baghdad or other big cities. If they do, they will exist not as peacekeepers but as what James Webb calls "50,000 targets." Western forces are safest in fortified desert enclaves. Occupying major cities is best handled by Arabs or at least Muslims.⁷⁴

Ideal peacekeeping candidates are Egypt and Jordan. Both countries regularly conduct military exercises with CENTCOM. Egypt is a staunch ally and receives \$2.25 billion in U.S. aid annually,⁷⁵ while Jordan receives \$850 million, which is more than their entire annual defense budget.⁷⁶ Turkish troops are not recommended because they are non-Arab and will be attacked by Iraqi Kurds. The Saudis are not recommended given their lack of endorsement for a representative Palestinian government. The Monarchy understandably fears democratic ideals. The Bangladeshi's are historically receptive, as they receive good pay, prestige and training with the latest technology.⁷⁷ But are they worth inviting?

Western occupation troops must be *well* educated and sensitive to Iraqi cultural differences. Further, a General Order banning western troops from dating Iraqi nationals and drinking alcohol is required.

Eliminate the requirement for 6 months of English training, as practicable, prior to Iraqi officers attending police, flight or specialized training schools in the U.S. Training Iraqis with Arabic speaking instructors will be faster.

COG is the will of the Iraqi people, not killing guerrillas or terrorists.⁷⁸

➤ Economic.

Our goal is to position U.S. forces in areas where they have protection, but can still influence and shape the new government. A solution exists in parking tanks over the oil fields. Oil accounts for 95 percent of Iraq's foreign trade.⁷⁹ If we control oil production, we control the economy and hence, Iraq.

Occupying Iraqi oilfields, though, will lend weight to charges of imperialism. Neutral inspectors and transparent accounting, with audits, must be employed to ensure oil proceeds benefit the Iraqi people.⁸⁰

Aid (loans and expertise) and reform must be linked, provided we are aware of the law of unintended consequences. A complete cut-off of aid leads to lost military contacts and key intelligence sources. Aid must be directed to where it is needed, not where non-government organizations (NGOs) and civilian agencies feel safe. A parallel Catch-22 proved disastrous in Vietnam, where land reform could not be accomplished until the areas were secure, but security could not be accomplished until land reform had been implemented.⁸¹

Give aid directly to mayors. Though not entirely eliminating the prospect of graft, it minimizes administrative costs and middlemen while raising accountability.

Conclusion. In nation building, CENTCOM's role in Iraq is providing a safe and secure environment so that MOOTW can proceed. Once Iraq is secure, government building can begin and NGOs can deliver aid and training to where they are needed most.

After a string of bloody dictators and almost constant conflict and repression, the Iraqi people deserve a democratic government. The Swiss cantonal system exists as our best hope for providing democracy and stability to Iraq. Keeping Iraq intact, however, presents a challenge. The cantonal system meets that challenge and respects the vast ethnic and religious diversity in Iraq and also addresses the concerns of Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The Chinese Kanji character for crisis consists of two distinct brush strokes; one represents danger, the other opportunity. The dangers confronting nation building in Iraq are oil fires, terrorism, an embedded civil war, demographics and Balkanization. Those dangers are manageable. However, our critical vulnerability and lubricant for failure will be the number of casualties. Casualties are a certainty, especially while occupying Iraq. They must be justified to the American public. Iraqi casualties might be just as dangerous to our long term goals. In a sense, CENTCOM is in a race against time. They must install a stable democratic government before the American public grows tired of the mission.

The opportunities inherent in a democratic Iraq are stability in the critical Persian Gulf region and over the long term, a reduction in major military force commitments to *contain* Iraq. Unlike previous nation building efforts, Iraq has the resources with which to finance this effort.

President Clinton promised a withdrawal of all American troops from Bosnia after one year. It has now been seven with no exit date or strategy in sight. We can learn from past experience and do better in Iraq. With a well thought out plan that is quickly executed

and carefully administered we will be able to restructure Iraq and exit quickly.⁸² Indeed, we can win.

Notes

¹ Paul Reynolds, "U.S. Re-thinks Nation Building," 6 October 2002.

<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2304081.stm>> [19 January 2002].

² Terry L Rice, "Forging Security Through Peace," Military Review, April 1992, p. 16.

³ The British tried in Egypt, and to some extent in Iraq.

⁴ James G. Kellas, The Problems of Minorities in the Nation-Building Process: The Kurds, the Copts and the Berbers. (New York, Vantage Press, 1971), 2.

⁵ Ofra Bengio, "Nation Building in Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Case of Iraq," Minorities and the State in the Arab World. 1 July 2000. <<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/bengio/bengio08.html>> [27 Dec 2002]

⁶ In 1958, BGEN Kassem murdered King Faisal and most of his family. His dictatorship survived a bloody military revolt in 1959, and Kassem was subsequently wounded by an assassin's bullet that same year. Kassem then laid claim to Kuwait and fought a major Kurdish secession movement before being assassinated by COL Arif. Arif fought a Kurdish insurrection and was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966. He was succeeded by his brother, Arif II, who was overthrown in 1968 by the Baathist Party under GEN Bakr. Bakr fought the Kurds repeatedly and resigned in poor health in 1979. He was replaced by Saddam Hussein, who fought the Kurds and invaded Iran and Kuwait. Source: Encyclopedia Americana.

⁷ Boot, Max, "Liberal Imperialism," American Heritage, 53 (Jun-Jul 2002): 66.

⁸ During the Iran-Iraq war, the price of oil hit \$53 per bbl. Source: James L. Williams, "Oil Price History and Analysis." 2001. <<http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm>> [2 January 2003]. Additionally, two U.S. warships hit mines while escorting re-flagged tankers and an estimated 700,000 men died during 8 years of war. Source: "The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988," Iraq, 21 December 1999. <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/iran-iraq.htm>> [19 December 2002].

⁹ The imperative is to deal with Saddam now or deal with a nuclear-armed Saddam later.

¹⁰ It is critical to point out that my DES does not mean deterring terrorism by offering economic hope. Indeed, poverty is *not* the cause of terrorism. Poverty can exist without terrorism and terrorism can exist without poverty. For illustrations of the former, one look no further than sub-Saharan Africa or Bangladesh as poverty stricken areas without terrorism. Examples of the latter include rich states like Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. If wealth prevented terrorism, then Saudi Arabia would be terror free. 15 of the 19 September 11th terrorists held Saudi passports.

Note that the DES also does not mention details like irrigation projects, food self sufficiency, riparian rights, damn projects, schools, hospitals, taxes, etc. They are all internal Iraqi affairs or U.N. problems.

¹¹ Col. Englert, Marvin, USA, Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 6 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Mahan Hall, Newport, R.I.

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "U.S. Wants To Keep Iraq Intact," USA Today, 30 December 2002, sec. A, p. 6.

¹⁵ Donald Chisholm, Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, U.S. Naval War College, class lecture, 7 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Hewitt Hall, Newport, R.I.

¹⁶ Ofra Bengio, "Nation Building in Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Case of Iraq." Minorities and the State in the Arab World. 1 July 2000. <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/bengio/bengio08.html> [27 Dec 2002].

¹⁷ Not all 50,000 Kurds were killed by chemical weapons. Ibid, p4.

¹⁸ Col. Englert, Marvin, USA, Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 6 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Mahan Hall, Newport, R.I.

¹⁹ CIA, Atlas of the Middle East, (Washington, DC: GPO, January 1993), 15-16.

²⁰ CIA data states Shi'a population as 60-65%. Source: "CIA World Factbook." Iraq. 1 Jan 2002. < <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html> > [19 Dec 2002]. Iran source ibid with following exception: <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html>>

²¹ Ofra Bengio, "Nation Building in Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Case of Iraq." Minorities and the State in the Arab World. 1 July 2000. <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/bengio/bengio08.html> [27 Dec 2002].

²² "CIA World Factbook." Iraq. 1 Jan 2002. < <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html> > [19 Dec 2002].

²³ Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1994), 36

²² "Appearance and Spread of Islamism," Algeria. 2001. <<http://www.ub.es/solidaritat/observatori/english/algeria/analysis/history.htm>> [5 January 2003].

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "Iraq," Country Analysis Briefs. October 2002. <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html>> [3 January 2003].

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ .55 m bbls/day x (\$23.80 - .99 cents per bbl to produce) = \$12.55 million per day, or \$4.58 billion/yr.

²⁹ "CIA World Factbook." Iraq. 1 Jan 2002. < <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html> > [19 Dec 2002].

³⁰ "Environmental Terrorism," Iraq. November 2000. <www.ems.org/war/wars.html> [2 Jan 2003].

³¹ "Iraq," Country Analysis Brief. October 2002. <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html> [3 January 2003].

³² "Iraq," Country Analysis Brief. October 2002. <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html> [3 January 2003].

³³ "Oil and Gas Opportunities in Iraq." July 2000. < <http://www.emerging-markets.com/PDF/IraqOilandGasOpportunities.PDF> > [28 Jan 2003].

³⁴ "Key Command Banned Nearly All Attacks On Afghan Roads, Bridges," Inside the Pentagon, 9 Jan 2003, p. 1.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Paul G O'Connor, "Waging War with Non-Lethal Weapons." Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns. Maxwell AFB, Alabama, April, 1998. <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/98-279.pdf>> [27 December 2002].

³⁷ Paul Starr, Robert Kuttner and Harold Meyerson, "A Reckless Rush to War," The American Prospect, 21 October 2002, p. 2.

³⁸ 2001 are the last figures available. Source: "Country Analysis Briefs." Iraq. October 2002. <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html>> [3 Jan 2003].

³⁹ Iraq's traditional enemy is Iran. As Iran edges closer to joining the nuclear club, the DRI will at some point need protection from Persian black mail. Indeed, time is of the essence for an enforceable Arab treaty banning WMD, which will increase stability in the region.

⁴⁰ G. E. von Grunebaum, Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity (New York: Vintage Books 1964), 278.

⁴¹ Gary Fuller, The Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict: A Geographic Overview. "The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic Perspectives," (CIA, October 1995), 152-4.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ "CIA World Factbook." Iraq. 1 Jan 2002. <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>> [19 December 2002].

⁴⁴ Congress, Senate, Senate Majority Staff, Fact Sheet on CBO Cost Estimate of Potential Military Conflict With Iraq, Chairman Kent Conrad, D-ND, 1 October 2002. <http://www.senate.gov/~budget/democratic/press/2002/fact%20sheet_Cost%20of%20Iraq%20War10.02.02.pdf?index=3822&sequence=0> [2 January 2003].

⁴⁵ Gary T. Dempsey, "Old Folly in a New Disguise, Nation Building to Combat Terrorism," Policy Analysis, 429 (21 March 2002): 7.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Authors experience while living in Atsugi, Japan from 1994-1997.

⁵⁰ Richard Holbrooke, "Rebuilding Nations," The Washington Post, 1 Apr 2002, sec A, p.14.

⁵¹ Ambrose, Stephen, "The Master Nation Builder: America has done it before and should do it again." National Review. 15 October 2002. <<http://www.nationalreview.com/flashback/flashback-ambrose101502.asp>> [16 December 2002].

⁵² Col. Englert, Marvin, USA, Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 6 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Mahan Hall, Newport, R.I.

⁵³ "Richard C. Holbrooke." 2002. <<http://www.greatertalent.com/bios/holbrooke.shtml>> [2 January

⁵⁴ International Crisis Group, "Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement," 28 October 1999, <<http://www.crisisweb.org>> [21 December 2002].

⁵⁵ Ted Galen Carpenter, "Flirting With Nation Building in Afghanistan," 2 November 2001. <<http://www.cato.org/current/terrorism/pubs/carpenter-011102.html>> [3 January 2003].

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Promoting Understanding Between the Arab World and the U.S. 2002. <<http://www.harvardarabalumni.org/symposium.html>> [16 January 2003].

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ U.S. demographics were not part of the CIA study. The parallel example, however, was the insight of Dr. Kaiser. Source: David Kaiser, Professor of Strategy and Policy, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 30 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Hewitt Hall, Newport, R.I.

⁶⁰ The precise costs of Iraq II are hard to calculate because the coalition, duration and damage are yet to be determined.

⁶¹ Irene L. Gendzier, Notes From the Minefield (New York: Columbia University Press 1997), 98.

⁶² Eric Margolis, "Spare Afghanistan From U.S. Nation Building," The Toronto Sun, 30 September 2001, sec A, p. 11.

⁶³ Code named Operation Ajax and approved by President Eisenhower. Source: Irene L. Gendzier, Notes From the Minefield (New York: Columbia University Press 1997), 149.

⁶⁴ "The Case of the U.S. vs. Iraq," Violations of UN Resolutions. 14 September 2002. <<http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/020914/2002091429.html>> [23 December 2002].

⁶⁵ Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1994), 36

⁶⁶ This is similar to state governments and state constitutions in the United States.

⁶⁷ Kendall, Francis, The Swiss Cantonal System. 2000. <<http://www.isil.org/resources/lit/swiss-canton-system.html>> [7 January 2003].

⁶⁸ Ambrose, Stephen, "The Master Nation Builder." National Review. 15 October 2002. <<http://www.nationalreview.com/flashback/flashback-ambrose101502.asp>> [16 December 2002].

⁶⁹ Visual Flight Rules, as opposed to instrument flying.

⁷⁰ "CIA World Factbook." Iraq. 1 Jan 2002. <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>> [19 Dec 2002].

⁷¹ "Iraq." Country Analysis Brief. October 2002. <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html> [3 January 2003].

⁷² Col. John D. Waghelstein, USA, Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 13 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Connelly Hall, Newport, R.I.

⁷³ One idea concerns enlisting Hollywood to educate the American public on the mission. This proved tremendously successful in WWII, when director Frank Capra produced the *Why We Fight* series.

⁷⁴ A potential problem exists with that concept, however. In Gulf War I, Arab coalition members refused to step foot in Iraq. The mission they signed on for only encompassed removing Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

⁷⁵ “CIA World Factbook.” Egypt. 1 Jan 2002. <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/eg.html>> [19 Dec 2002].

⁷⁶ “CIA World Factbook.” Jordan. 1 Jan 2002. <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/jo.html>> [19 Dec 2002].

⁷⁷ Col. Englert, Marvin, USA, Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 6 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Mahan Hall, Newport, R.I.

⁷⁸ Col. John D. Waghelstein, USA, Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 13 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Connelly Hall, Newport, R.I.

⁷⁹ “CIA World Factbook.” Iraq. 1 Jan 2002. <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>> [19 Dec 2002].

⁸⁰ Accounting on the internet with strict accounting rules will prevent charges of imperialism.

⁸¹ Col. John D. Waghelstein, USA, Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 13 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Connelly Hall, Newport, R.I.

⁸² In the absence of recognizing a Kurdish nation, we may be able to fix and exit Iraq before Bosnia. Source: Col. Englert, Marvin, USA, Professor of Joint Maritime Operations, U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 6 January 2003. Notes. U. S. Naval War College, Mahan Hall, Newport, R.I.

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